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I. INTRODUCTION
The Washington Supreme Court finds it acceptable when one
defendant is sentenced to death, while five equally culpable defendants
are not.' On its face, this is grossly unfair to the defendant singled
out to die while his brethren live out their lives in prison. While
paying lip service to the elimination of arbitrary death sentences, the
Washington Supreme Court continues to do nothing to solve this
problem. Perhaps most unfortunate for those defendants dispropor-
tionately sentenced is that the means for a more rational application of
the death sentence is already present in Washington's death penalty
statute. This means is "comparative proportionality review. '"2 Used
correctly by the judiciary, this tool has the potential to make real
progress toward nonarbitrary, nondiscriminatory, and fair death
sentences.
Comparative proportionality review determines whether a given
death sentence is "excessive or disproportionate" compared to the
penalty imposed in "similar cases."' The Washington Supreme Court
conducts comparative proportionality review in all cases in which the
death sentence is imposed.4 Ideally, if the Court finds that a jury has
arbitrarily sentenced a defendant to death compared to other defen-
dants, the review should provide the procedural means to alter a death
sentence to a sentence of life in prison. Comparative proportionality
review legislation finds its origin in the United States Supreme Court
case Furman v. Georgia.'
- B.S. 1992, Mechanical Engineering, University of Washington; J.D. 1995, Seattle
University School of Law.
1. This Comment will argue that State v. Benn is such a case. See infra note 199.
2. See infra note 199 (describing the distinction between "traditional proportionality review"
and "comparative proportionality review.").
3. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(2)(b) (1994).
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.100 (1994).
5. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). See infra text accompanying notes 37-57.
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In 1972, Furman v. Georgia invalidated several states' death
penalty statutes as violating the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.6 Some of the common themes
among the concurring justices were that death sentences were being
imposed in an arbitrary, discriminatory, and random fashion.7
Because many states had similar statutory schemes, Furman can be said
to have briefly eliminated the death penalty in the United States.'
Even today, the concerns of the Furman court continue to haunt the
application of the death penalty.9 Comparative proportionality review
was one common procedural method by which many states attempted
to bring their death penalty statutes into compliance with Furman.1"
In State v. Benn, 1 a case involving a grisly double murder, the
Washington Supreme Court demonstrated the difficulty of applying
comparative proportionality review in practice. In Benn, six justices,
in a majority and concurring opinion, agreed that a sentence of death
was "proportionate," while three justices vigorously disagreed. The
various procedures used by the justices to reach their conclusions were
dissimilar, making this case an excellent vehicle for examining
comparative proportionality review. Benn demonstrates some of the
many flaws inherent in the Washington Supreme Court's use of
comparative proportionality review including (1) the use of inconsistent
logic to rationalize whether a particular case is "similar," (2) the lack
of any methodology for the comparison of "similar" cases, and (3) the
fact that no clear consensus exists about what comparative proportion-
ality review is attempting to accomplish. These flaws are fatal to the
application of comparative proportionality review; as a result, the
review is merely a means by which the judges may arbitrarily decide
whether or not a death sentence is aproppriate.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 13-36.
7. See id.
8. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 411-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that Furman
invalidates every death penalty statute in the country); State v. Baker, 81 Wash. 2d 281, 282, 501
P.2d 284, 284 (1972) (declaring Washington's death penalty statute unconstitutional).
9. In 1994, Justice Blackmun, who wrote a dissenting opinion in Furman, reversed himself
and concluded "[i]t is virtually self-evident to me now that no combination of procedural rules
or substantive regulation ever can save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional
deficiencies." Callims v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). See generally David C. Baldus et al., Reflections on the "Inevitability" of
Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing and the "Impossibility" of its Prevention, Detection, and
Correction, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV 359 (1994); Samuel R. Gross and Robert Mauro, Patterns
of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37
STAN. L. REV. 27 (1984).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 37-57.
11. 120 Wash. 2d 631, 845 P.2d 289, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 382 (1993).
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Although Washington's present statutory death penalty scheme
would almost certainly pass constitutional scrutiny on its face,12 this
Comment will argue that Washington's application of comparative
proportionality review does little to protect defendants from discrimina-
tory, arbitrary, or unfair death sentences. However, if comparative
proportionality review was used properly by the Washington Supreme
Court, it could be a powerful tool to address some of these concerns.
This Comment attempts to achieve several objectives. Part II
discusses the reasons that the death penalty was found to be unconsti-
tutional in Furman v. Georgia. Part III reviews several post-Furman
Supreme Court cases and the revised death penalty statutes that were
deemed to satisfy the procedural inadequacies found in pre-Furman
death sentence statutes. This Part also discusses the role proportionali-
ty review plays in making a death penalty statute constitutional. Part
IV examines the development of comparative proportionality review in
the State of Washington. State v. Benn will serve as the focus of this
discussion. Part V demonstrates that Washington's application of
comparative proportionality review is seriously flawed in several
respects. These flaws include both the procedural means that the court
has used to choose similar cases, and substantive concerns that the
court has never clearly defined the purpose of comparative proportion-
ality review. Finally, Part VI of this Comment will advocate a more
suitable method for applying comparative proportionality review,
paying special attention to the reasoning of the Furman court and the
flaws that caused the 1972 U.S. Supreme Court to find several states'
death penalty statutes unconstitutional.
II. BACKGROUND-FURMAN V. GEORGIA
Under the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, punishment
may not be cruel and unusual.13 In the watershed case Furman v.
Georgia,'4 the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to determine whether
the death penalty, as applied in two states, violated this amendment."5
The Court produced a brief per curium in which the nine justices
wrote separate opinions. Five concurring justices concluded that the
12. Georgia's death penalty scheme, which is facially similar to Washington's, was held
constitutional. See infra text accompanying notes 43-48.
13. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
14. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). The defendant Furman was convicted of rape in
Georgia and was sentenced to death. Id. at 239.
15. See id. The Georgia and Texas death penalty statutes were found to be unconstitutional.
Id. at 239-40.
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death penalty was unconstitutional. 6 Comparative proportionality
review was a direct response to Furman,7 and thus, it is important to
understand the rationale these justices used in reaching their conclu-
sion. Through such an understanding, comparative proportionality
review can best be utilized to remedy the constitutional flaws found by
the Furman court. Each concurring opinion in Furman will be
examined in turn.
Marshall and Brennan argued that the death penalty was
unconstitutional in all cases."8 Brennan believed that a penalty was
violative of the Eighth Amendment's restriction against cruel and
unusual punishment when it did not "comport with human digni-
ty."' 9 He also characterized the application of the death penalty as
"freadshly" or "spectacularly" rare.20 Finally, Brennan argued that
the worst crimes were not those punished by death. He stated that
"[nlo one has yet suggested a rational basis that could differentiate in
those terms the few who die from the many who go to prison. '"21
Similarly, Marshall viewed the death penalty as being constitution-
al at one time, but becoming cruel and unusual due to the evolving
nature of our society.22 He was also concerned with the discriminato-
ry application of the death penalty and stated: "Regarding discrimina-
tion, it has been said that '[i]t is usually the poor, the illiterate, the
underprivileged, the member of the minority group-the man who,
16. Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 306
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 37-57.
18. Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring). He also viewed the death penalty as unique in its
"extreme severity," and pronounced: "Death is today an unusually severe punishment, unusual
in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity. No other existing punishment is comparable to
death in terms of physical and mental suffering." Id. at 287.
20. Id. at 293. Justice Brennan went on to state that "[w]hen the punishment of death is
inflicted in a trivial number of the cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually
inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery
system." Id.
21. Id. at 294. Brennan declared:
(T]here is a strong probability that [death] is inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection by
contemporary society is virtually total; and there is no reason to believe that it serves
any penal purpose more effectively than the less severe punishment of imprisonment.
The function of these principles is to enable a court to determine whether a punishment
comports with human dignity. Death, quite simply, does not.
Id. at 305.
22. Id. at 329 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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because he is without means, and is defended by a court-appointed
attorney-who becomes society's sacrificial lamb .... 23
The concurring opinions of Justices Stewart, White, and Doug-
las24 are probably the most important in Furman because they did not
advocate the elimination of the death penalty per se.25 These justices
were concerned with the lack of procedural safeguards and the blatant
unfairness that was so readily apparent in the application of death
penalty statutes of this time. However, they left the door open for an
improved procedural process in future death penalty statutes.26
Justice Stewart viewed the death penalty as being substantially
different from other forms of punishment.27 He found the imposition
of the death penalty to be "cruel and unusual in the same way that
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual," and concluded that a
penalty "so wantonly and so freakishly imposed" does not comply with
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.28
Justice White addressed only the narrow question of whether the
challenged death penalty statutes were constitutional. 29  He answered
this question in the negative for three reasons. First, he argued that a
penalty imposed so infrequently no longer serves the traditional
purposes of criminal justice.30 Second, he was concerned with the
arbitrary nature of the sentence and stated that "there is no meaningful
basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the
23. Id. at 364. Justice Marshall went on to state:
Indeed, a look at the bare statistics regarding executions is enough to betray much of
the discrimination. A total of 3,859 persons have been executed since 1930, of whom
1,751 were white and 2,066 were Negro. Of the executions, 3,334 were for murder;
1,664 of the executed murderers were white and 1,630 were Negro; 455 persons,
including 48 whites and 405 Negroes, were executed for rape.
Id. (citations deleted).
24. Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310
(White, J., concurring).
25. See id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); see id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at
310-11 (White, J., concurring).
26. See supra note 24.
27. Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring). He stated that:
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree
but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of
rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique,
finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity.
Id.
28. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 311 (White, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 313. White argued that penalties are cruel and unusual when "imposition would
then be the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any
discernible social or public purposes." Id. at 312.
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many cases in which it is not."31 Finally, Justice White was troubled
by the legislature delegating its authority, and essentially allowing
judges and juries unguided discretion. He pointed out that no matter
what the circumstances, a judge or jury could find the sentence of
death appropriate or inappropriate "without violating [the legislature's]
trust or any statutory policy. ' 3
2
Justice Douglas' arguments paralleled those of Justice Vhite, as
he pointed to evidence of discriminatory application of the death
penalty,33 and uncontrolled judge and jury discretion.34 He argued
that a law that stated on its face that only poor, uneducated blacks
could be executed would plainly fail the "cruel and unusual" punish-
ment clause of the Eighth Amendment.3" And any law that reached
the same result in practice "has no more sanctity than a law which in
terms provides the same." 3
6
By finding that Georgia's discretionary death penalty statute, with
its complete lack of procedural safeguards, violated the Eighth
Amendment to the Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court sent the
states scurrying to alter their death penalty statutes. As these revised
statutes were challenged, the U.S. Supreme Court began to paint a
clearer picture of what was required to make a death penalty statute
constitutionally valid.
III. POST-FURMAN SUPREME COURT CASES
States quickly changed the procedures in their death penalty
statutes in an attempt to remedy the many flaws addressed by the
Furman court. For example, the revised Georgia death penalty statute
provided for a separate sentencing hearing where the defendant could
only be sentenced to death if at least one of ten statutorily defined
aggravating circumstances was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.3 7
The defendant was allowed to show evidence of mitigating circum-
stances and was given substantial latitude as to the types of evidence
31. Id. at 313.
32. Id. at 314.
33. Id. at 250 n.15 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas argued, "[i]t would seem to
be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is 'unusual' if it discriminates
against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed
under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices" Id. at 242.
34. Id. at 253. He said that "[p]eople live or die, dependent on the whim of one man or 12."
Id.
35. Id. at 256.
36. Id.




that he could introduce.3" Additionally, the statute required that the
state supreme court perform comparative proportionality review for all
death sentences and to determine whether the sentence was dispropor-
tionate to those sentences imposed in similar cases.39 Four years after
Furman, the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the new
death penalty statutes in Georgia,4" Florida,4 and Texas42 were
constitutional. Gregg v. Georgia addressed Georgia's new death penalty
statute.
Three justices that were at odds with each other in Furman wrote
a decisive plurality opinion in Gregg. 3 They concluded that Geor-
gia's revised statute adequately directed and limited judge or jury
discretion, and held that the statute was constitutional." The Court
was impressed with several features of Georgia's statutory plan. First,
the Court believed that the bifurcated proceedings and enumerated
aggravating circumstances helped guide the jury, and hence, reduced
the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.45 Second, comparative
proportionality review was deemed to provide a safeguard against an
"aberrant" jury.46 And finally, the statute provided flexible and
individualized procedures for determining whether the death penalty
was being imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 47  Wash-
ington's death penalty statute is similar to Georgia's constitutionally
valid statute. 8
While Gregg established that Georgia's death penalty statute was
constitutional, 9 it did not answer the question of whether any of the
particular procedural mechanisms used by Georgia were constitutional-
ly required. The Supreme Court case Pulley v. Harris0 directly
addressed whether comparative proportionality review was a prerequi-
site to a constitutional death penalty statute, and therefore, is helpful
38. Id.
39. See id. at 198 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(c) (Supp. 1975)).
40. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
41. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
42. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
43. See 428 U.S. at 158 (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
44. Id. at 197, 207.
45. Id. at 187-98.
46. Id. at 206.
47. Id. at 193-99. The court stated that "where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on
a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that
discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action." Id. at 189.
48. See infra note 59.
49. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207.
50. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
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in determining what procedural mechanisms must be included in a
death penalty statute. The Pulley court held that, despite the approval
of comparative proportionality review in Gregg, comparative propor-
tionality review is not indispensable."1 Pulley concluded that no
particular review procedure is required, there must simply be "a means
to promote the evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition of
death sentences."52 It is also likely that some form of "meaningful"
appellate review is required. 3
In summary, if death penalty statutes promote an evenhanded,
consistent application of the sentence, they will pass constitutional
scrutiny.5 4 Furman and Gregg indicate several factors that contribute
to making a death penalty statute unconstitutional. These include a
lack of legislative guidance and a lack of a rational means for distin-
guishing between the few criminals who receive the death penalty and
those who do not. 5  Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court is
concerned with discrimination and the arbitrary and capricious
imposition of the death penalty.5 6 Pulley establishes that comparative
proportionality review is not constitutionally required. 7 However, in
many states, comparative proportionality review is one of the procedur-
al means by which the legislature has tried to eliminate the arbitrary
imposition of death. And while the review itself may not be required,
if death penalty statutes, including Washington's, do not have working
safeguards to protect defendants from the systematic defects that
haunted pre-Furman death sentences, the statutes will not be constitu-
tionally valid.
51. Id. at 45.
52. Id. at 49 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 276).
53. See id. at 54 (Stevens, J., concurring).
54. See generally State v. Bartholomew, 98 Wash. 2d 173, 654 P.2d 1170 (1982) (providing
background discussion of Furman and Gregg), vacated mer., 463 U.S. 1203 (1983).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 13-48.
56. See id.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
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IV. WASHINGTON STATE
A. Background
Washington's current statutory scheme for the imposition of the
death penalty was enacted in 1981."5 Similar to Georgia's death
penalty statute,59 the scheme provides guidance to judge and jury, in
an attempt to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory sentences of death.
Washington's statutory scheme limits the sentence of death to
those found guilty of aggravated murder.6' A person is guilty of
aggravated murder if he or she commits murder in the first degree and
one or more of ten statutorily defined aggravating circumstances are
present.61  At a minimum, a person found guilty of aggravated
58. Act of May 14, 1981, ch. 138, 1981 WASH. LAWS 535 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.95 (1994)).
59. Washington's statutorily required mandatory sentence review, which includes
comparative proportionality review, is patterned after Georgia's death penalty statute.
Bartholomew, 98 Wash. 2d at 191, 654 P.2d at 1181. The Washington Supreme Court stated that
"[a]t least in broad outline, the (Washington] statute corresponds quite regularly to the schemes
approved by the [U.S. Supreme] Court, in particular the Georgian statute upheld in Gregg v.
Georgia." Id. at 187, 654 P.2d at 1179. While acknowledging that differences existed between
Washington's death penalty statute and any the U.S. Supreme Court had directly reviewed, see
id., the Washington Supreme Court concluded that Washington's death penalty statute was
constitutionally valid. See id. at 176, 654 P.2d at 1173. However, the court slightly modified the
statute to preserve that constitutionality. See id. at 198-99, 654 P.2d at 1185.
60. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 (1994).
61. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.020 (1994). The aggravating circumstances are:
(1) The victim was a law enforcement officer, corrections officer, or fire fighter who was
performing his or her official duties at the time of the act resulting in death and the
victim was known or reasonably should have been known by the person to be such at
the time of the killing;
(2) At the time of the act resulting in the death, the person was serving a term of
imprisonment, had escaped, or was on authorized or unauthorized leave in or from a
state facility or program for the incarceration or treatment of persons adjudicated guilty
of crimes;
(3) At the time of the act resulting in death, the person was in custody in a county or
county-city jail as a consequence of having been adjudicated guilty of a felony;
(4) The person committed the murder pursuant to an agreement that he or she would
receive money or any other thing of value for committing the murder;
(5) The person solicited another person to commit the murder and had paid or had
agreed to pay money or any other thing of value for committing the murder;
(6) The victim was:
(a) A judge; juror or former juror; prospective, current, or former witness in an
adjudicative proceeding; prosecuting attorney; deputy prosecuting attorney; defense
attorney; a member of the intermediate sentence review board; or a probation or parole
officer; and
(b) The murder was related to the exercise of official duties performed or to be
performed by the victim;
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murder shall serve a life sentence without the possibility of release.62
At the prosecutor's discretion, a special sentencing proceeding may be
sought to impose the penalty of death.63 Generally, the same jury
that heard and determined the guilt of the defendant is asked whether
they are "convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not
sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency.""" In making
this determination, the jury is to consider eight statutorily defined
mitigating circumstances.6" Also, all relevant evidence with probative
(7) The person committed the murder to conceal the commission of a crime or to
protect or conceal the identity of any person committing a crime;
(8) There was more than one victim and the murders were part of a common scheme
or plan or the result of a single act of the person;
(9) The murder was committed in the course of, in furtherance of, or in immediate
flight from one of the following crimes:
(a) Robbery in the first or second degree;
(b) Rape in the first or second degree;
(c) Burglary in the first or second degree or residential burglary;
(d) Kidnapping in the first degree; or
(e) Arson in the first degree;
(10) The victim was regularly employed or self-employed as a newsreporter and the
murder was committed to obstruct or hinder the investigative, research, or reporting
activities of the victim.
Id.
62. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030(1) (1994).
63. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.040(1) (1994); see Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453,
1465 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding that the code section that allowed prosecutorial discretion in
deciding to seek the death penlaty was constitutional; the prosecutor is not permitted to seek the
death penalty unless there is reason to believe there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances
to merit leniency), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988).
64. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.060(4) (1994).
65. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.070 (1994). Those mitigating circumstances are:
(1) Whether the defendant has or does not have a significant history, either as a juvenile
or an adult, of prior criminal activity;
(2) Whether the murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence
of extreme mental disturbance;
(3) Whether the victim consented to the act of murder;
(4) Whether the defendant was an accomplice to a murder committed by another person
where the defendant's participation in the murder was relatively minor;
(5) Whether the defendant acted under duress or domination of another person;
(6) Whether, at the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements
of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect. However, a
person found to be mentally retarded under RCW 10.95.030(2) may in no case be
sentenced to death;
(7) Whether the age of the defendant at the time of the crime calls for leniency; and
(8) Whether there is a likelihood that the defendant will pose a danger to others in the
future.
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value is admissible, whether or not the evidence was admissible during
the original trial.66
If the jury does not grant leniency, the sentence of death is
imposed. The Washington Supreme Court must then undertake a
mandatory review of the death sentence." In this review, the court
determines: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to forego
leniency, (2) whether the sentence of death is excessive or dispropor-
tionate, (3) whether the sentence of death was brought about through
passion or prejudice, and (4) whether the defendant was mentally
retarded.68 The legislature clearly has attempted to eliminate arbitrary
death sentences by limiting the discretion of both judge and jury.69
Comparative proportionality review plays an important role in this
scheme, it is the only procedure that allows any sort of comparison
with previously decided cases.
In Washington, comparative proportionality review is statutorily
required:7 °
[T]he supreme court of Washington shall determine... [w]hether
the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the
defendant. For the purposes of this subsection, "similar cases"
means cases reported in the Washington Reports or Washington
Appellate Reports since January 1, 1965, in which the judge or jury
considered the imposition of capital punishment regardless of
whether it was imposed or executed, and cases in which reports have
been filed with the supreme court under RCW 10.95.120."'
The plain language of this statute sets out minimal guidelines for
determining whether a defendant's sentence is excessive or dispropor-
tionate to penalties imposed in similar cases. First, the statute
mandates that the court consider both the crime and the defendant.
Second, the statute indicates where "similar cases" are to be found.
66. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.060(3) (1994).
67. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.100 (1994).
68. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(2) (1994).
69. State v. Campbell illustrates this point:
At four specific points, the statutory scheme narrows the class of persons subject to the
death penalty: first, on the basis of specific elements of aggravated murder; second,
with the prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty for lack of mitigating
circumstances; third, with the jury's consideration of mitigating circumstances; and
fourth, with [the Supreme Court's] ultimate review of the prior proceedings.
State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1, 40, 691 P.2d 929, 952, (1984) (Rosellini, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1094 (1985).
70. See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 10.95.100, .130(2Xb) (1994).
71. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(2)(b) (1994).
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Finally, "similar cases" are defined as cases in which the death penalty
was considered.
The Washington Supreme Court has struggled in its attempt to
apply comparative proportionality review. To emphasize what the
court has done in the past, a brief history of the court's use of
comparative proportionality review, the standard for when a sentence
is proportionate, along with the methodology formulated to group
similar cases, is described in the following text.
The Washington Supreme Court first applied comparative
proportionality review in State v. Campbell.72 Campbell committed
three extremely brutal murders, in which at least four aggravating
factors were present.7" These included killing a witness and murder-
ing to protect his identity.74 The very fact that Campbell's crimes
were so heinous made comparative proportionality review difficult.
The court could not find any similar cases, and stated that it would be
difficult "to find killings more premeditated and revengeful than those
committed by defendant."7" The court held that the penalty of death
was not disproportionate.76
In State v. Harris,77 the Washington Supreme Court began to
refine the standard for determining when a sentence is proportionate.
The court acknowledged that the language of Washington's statute was
identical to Georgia's statute, and decided that it might be helpful to
use Georgia's interpretation of its own statute as a guideline.7" State
v. Rupe continued this refinement stating that "a death sentence must
not be affirmed where death sentences have not generally been imposed
in similar cases, nor where it has been 'wantonly and freakishly
72. See 103 Wash. 2d 1, 691 P.2d 929 (1984).
73. Id. at 13, 691 P.2d at 937.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 30, 691 P.2d at 946.
76. Id.
77. 106 Wash. 2d 784, 725 P.2d 975 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 (1987), amended and
superseded by Harris v. Blodgett, 853 F. Supp. 1239 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (overruling the
Washington Supreme Court's application of comparative proportionality review). For a further
discussion of why the federal court concluded that the Washington Supreme Court did not carry
out its statutory mandate, see infra note 173 (last two paragraphs).
78. Id. at 798, 725 P.2d at 982. In Georgia, the test for proportionality included a
consideration of whether death sentences have been imposed "generally" in similar cases. Id.
(citing Moore v. State, 233 Ga. 861, 864, 213 S.E.2d 829 (1975)).
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imposed."' 7 9  The court also stated that an occasional aberrational
outcome does not require reversal.8"
The Washington Supreme Court has developed an unstructured
methodology for the selection of similar cases. This selection process
is crucial to performing meaningful comparative proportionality review.
Without a subset of truly similar cases, it is impossible to determine
whether a particular sentence is proportionate to other similarly
situated defendants. The court often begins this process of grouping
similar cases by comparing the statutory aggravating factors associated
with the crime."' Rupe is a good example of this process.
Rupe murdered two adult female victims during a bank rob-
bery. 2 Aggravating circumstances included concealment of identity,
existence of multiple victims, and that the murders were committed in
the course of a robbery.83 In selecting similar cases for the purpose
of applying comparative proportionality review, the Washington
Supreme Court found; (1) one case with the same combination of
aggravating factors, (2) six cases with two of the aggravating factors,
and (3) one case where two of the aggravating factors were alleged. 4
In four of the eight cases the death penalty was imposed; hence, the
Rupe court found that the sentence was not disproportionate.
8 5
The Washington Supreme Court has often tried to distinguish
cases that it views as dissimilar, even if the cases have roughly the
same number or type of aggravating circumstances.8 6 In doing so, the
court has considered factors such as the age or number of the victims,
mental illness, brutality, and the degree of suffering. 7 Additionally,
the court will consider whether the characteristics of the defendants are
similar. 8 For example, a court could find a case dissimilar based on
the fact that a defendant had several mitigating circumstances.
79. State v. Rupe, 108 Wash. 2d 734, 767, 743 P.2d 210, 229 (1987) (citing State v. Harris,
106 Wash. 2d at 798, 725 P.2d at 982), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061 (1988)).
80. Id. at 767, 743 P.2d at 229. Citing Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 54 (1984), the court
stated that "any capital sentencing scheme may produce aberrational outcomes on occasion, and
that such inconsistencies are not like the major systematic defects the Court identified in Furman
v. Georgia." Id.
81. See id. at 768, 743 P.2d at 229.
82. Id. at 738, 743 P.2d at 214.
83. Id. at 768, 743 P.2d at 229.
84. Id. at 768-69, 743 P.2d at 229-30.
85. Id. at 770, 743 P.2d at 230.
86. See State v. Rice, 110 Wash. 2d 577, 627-28, 757 P.2d 889, 916 (1988), cert. denied, 491
U.S. 910 (1989).
87. Id.
88. See Rupe, 108 Wash. 2d at 770, 743 P.2d at 230; State v. Mak, 105 Wash. 2d 692, 724,
718 P.2d 407, 427, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 (1986).
1995]
Seattle University Law Review
In 1991, the Washington Supreme Court attempted to clarify the
statutory terms "excessive" and "disproportionate"8 9 in State v.
Lord."° Acknowledging that the statute provided little guidance in
interpreting when a death sentence becomes disproportionate, the court
began by looking to what it perceived to be the purpose of comparative
proportionality review." In the majority's opinion, comparative
proportionality review was designed to alleviate the major systematic
problems identified by the U.S. Supreme Court in Furman, specifically
the arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of the death penalty.92
The court stated that "[olur review is not intended to ensure that there
can be no variation on a case-by case basis, nor to guarantee that the
death penalty is always imposed in superficially similar circumstan-
ces."' It concluded that such a review would effectively eliminate
the death penalty.94
The court also recognized that a formalistic, mathematical
approach to finding similar cases was unworkable. Death penalty
crimes "are unique and cannot be matched up like so many points on
a graph."'' 5 The court advocated an approach of looking for a "family
resemblance" among death penalty cases.96 This approach acknowl-
edged that death penalty cases that do not necessarily have the same
attributes or characteristics can still be somehow related.97 While the
court did not specifically define "family resemblance," the approach
apparently rejects a systematic process, and advocates a loose,
unstructured means for determining whether a case is generally similar.
Since comparative proportionality review became statutorily
required in Washington, the Washington Supreme Court has
performed the review ten times.9 The sentence of death was found
89. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(2)(b) (1994).
90. 117 Wash. 2d 829, 822 P.2d 177 (1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 164 (1992).
91. Id. at 907-10, 822 P.2d at 221-23.
92. Id. at 910, 822 P.2d at 223.
93. Id.
94. Id. The court was apparently reasoning that if no variation on a case-by case basis was
allowed, because there is a large number of death-sentence eligible defendants who received the
sentence of life in prison, the death sentence would never be proportionate.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 911, 822 P.2d at 223.
97. Id.
98. State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1, 691 P.2d 929 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094
(1985); State v. Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d 398, 717 P.2d 722, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 922 (1986); In
re Jeffries, 114 Wash. 2d 485, 789 P.2d 731 (1990); State v. Harris, 106 Wash. 2d 784, 725 P.2d
975 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 (1987), amended and superseded by Harris v. Blodgett, 853
F. Supp. 1239 (W.D. Wash. 1994); State v. Mak, 105 Wash. 2d 692, 718 P.2d 407, cert. denied,
479 U.S. 995 (1986); State v. Rupe, 108 Wash. 2d 734, 743 P.2d 210 (1987), cet. denied, 486
U.S. 1061 (1988); State v. Rice, 110 Wash. 2d 577, 757 P.2d 889 (1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S.
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to be proportionate in all of these cases. State v. Benn is the most
recent case in which the Supreme Court held that a sentence of death
was proportionate.99 This Comment will use Benn as a vehicle to
examine the problems, and potential cures, of the application of
comparative proportionality review.
B. State v. Benn
1. Facts
Gary Michael Benn was convicted of two counts of aggravated
first degree murder.'0° His victims, one of whom was his half
brother, were each shot twice, once in the back of the head and once
in the chest.10' The motive for the murders was never determined,
though a jail house informant claimed that the victims were going to
expose a phony insurance claim in which Benn was involved.0 2
Because Benn was found guilty of aggravated murder, he was
eligible for the sentence of death.0 3 There were two aggravating
circumstances in Benn's crime: the existence of multiple victims and
a common scheme.'O° The court concluded that Benn did not have
a mental disease or defect, and that he was competent to stand
trial. 105 Benn's prior criminal record consisted of several property
crimes, 10 6 and the only mitigating circumstances offered in Benn's
defense were his good character and the negative impact his death
would have on his family.0 7 After the jury concluded that there
were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to merit leniency, Benn was
sentenced to death.'0 l  In undertaking the mandatory review of
Berm's death sentence, the Washington Supreme Court addressed the
issue of comparative proportionality review.'0 9 In majority, concur-
910 (1989); State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 822 P.2d 117 (1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 164
(1992); State v. Benn, 120 Wash. 2d 631, 845 P.2d 289, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 382 (1993).
99. During the final stages of writing this Comment, the Washington Supreme Court again
held that a sentence of death was proportionate. State v. Gentry, 129 Wash. 2d 570, - P.2d
- (1995). In Gentry, the court addressed the issue of comparative proportionality review in a
manner very similar to the Benn court.
100. Benn, 120 Wash. 2d at 638, 845 P.2d at 295.
101. Id. at 640, 845 P.2d at 295.
102. Id. at 641, 845 P.2d at 296.
103. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 (1994).
104. Benn, 120 Wash. 2d at 647, 845 P.2d at 299.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 699, 845 P.2d at 327 (Durham, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 647, 845 P.2d at 299.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 678, 845 P.2d at 316.
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ring, and dissenting opinions, the court grappled with a myriad of
issues.
2. Application of Comparative Proportionality Review
In each of the various opinions in Benn, the Washington Supreme
Court struggled with several issues. These included how to chose
similar cases, what cases are actually similar, and what makes a
sentence disproportionate. Notice that the majority and dissent
essentially agreed as to the process by which similar cases should be
chosen, but disagreed as to which cases are actually similar. The
concurrence, on the other hand, disagreed with the methodology that
the majority used, and advocated a process that seemingly does not
involve detailed factual comparisons between cases.
The majority opinion concluded that Benn's death sentence was
comparatively proportionate."' Advocating the "family resem-
blance" scheme set out in Lord, the court began its search for similar
cases by acknowledging that it had historically grouped similar cases
in terms of aggravating factors."'
As a starting point, the court summarized thirty multiple-murder
cases occurring in Washington since 1981 which were potentially
similar to Benn's.12  For example, Darrin Hutchinson shot two
deputies in the head at close range and was sentenced to life without
parole."' The only aggravating factor was multiple victims, while a 79
IQ, and intoxication, were offered as mitigating circumstances." 4
The majority's search for similar cases was an exhaustive process, as
the court used eight pages to examine thirty potentially similar
cases. 1 15
In reducing this large number of multiple-murder cases to a
workable group of similar cases, the court acknowledged the inherent
difficulties in identifring similar cases." 6  As a general rule, three
factors seemed to influence whether or not a particular defendant
received the death penalty: mental defects or disturbances, youthful-
110. Id. at 693, 845 P.2d at 324. Only two justices, Guy and Dore, signed this portion of
the majority opinion. See id. at 637, 695 (Durham, J., concurring), 696 (Utter, J., dissenting), 845
P.2d at 289, 325, 326.
Ill. Id. at 680-81, 845 P.2d at 317.
112. Id. at 681-88, 845 P.2d at 318-21.
113. Id. at 684, 845 P.2d at 319.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 681-88, 845 P.2d at 318-21.
116. Id. at 691, 845 P.2d at 323.
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ness of the defendant, or a plea of guilty."7 While realizing that
there are exceptions to this rule, the court apparently eliminated several
potentially similar cases on these grounds.11
Out of the thirty cases described in the majority opinion, seven
defendants were sentenced to death."9  In four of these cases, the
crimes committed by Campbell, Mak, Rice and Dodd were deemed by
the court to "differ greatly" from Benn's crime and were not simi-
lar.120 The other three cases where the defendant was sentenced to
death were all found to be similar to Benn's."' Out of the twenty-
three cases described in which the defendant was not sentenced to
death, four cases were found to be similar.' In sum, seven of the
thirty multiple murder cases were grouped together as similar to Benn's
case, and three of those seven defendants were sentenced to death.
Stating "[w]e have not sought to substitute this court's judgment for
that of the jury," ' the majority found three death sentences out of
seven similar cases to be comparatively proportionate, 124 and Benn's
sentence of death was upheld.
25
The concurring opinion did not agree with the methodology used.
by the majority in determining comparative proportionality. 26 They
claimed that Lord specifically rejected an approach that would require
"endless pages of comparisons to particular cases." 127 According to the
117. Id. The court surmised that a guilty plea may indicate remorse by the defendant, and
could be viewed as a significant mitigating factor. Id.
118. The court does not specify why many of the thirty described cases are not "similar" to
Benn's. But several defendants, such as Sanders, who raped and killed two 14 year old girls, and
Stevenson, who was convicted of three murders, were not included in the final pool of similar
cases. Id. at 687-88, 845 P.2d at 321. The difference between these crimes and Benn's crime was
apparently that Sanders pleaded guilty, and that Stevenson was 16 years old. Id.
119. Id. at 681-88, 845 P.2d at 318-22.
120. Id. at 689, 845 P.2d at 322. These crimes were more brutal than Benn's crime. For
example, Mak was convicted in the murder of thirteen victims. Id. at 685, 845 P.2d at 319-20.
The victims were hog-tied prior to their execution-like murders. Id. Rice murdered two adults
and two children, and all four victims were bludgeoned and stabbed to death. Id. at 687, 845
P.2d at 321.
121. Id. at 692, 845 P.2d at 323. The names of the defendants who were sentenced to death
and whose cases were found to be similar to Benn's are Hazen, Jeffries, and Rupe. Id.
122. Id. The names of the defendants who were not sentenced to death and whose cases
were found to be similar to Benn's are McKinley, Runion, Strandy, and Thompson. Id.
123. Id. at 693, 845 P.2d at 324.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 695, 845 P.2d at 325.
126. Id. at 695, 845 P.2d at 325 (Durham, J., concurring). This concurrence gathered the
most support on the court as to how comparative proportionality review should be applied. It was
signed by four justices, Durham, Brachtenbach, DoUiver, and Andersen. See id. at 696, 845 P.2d
at 325-26.
127. Id. at 695, 845 P.2d at 325.
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concurrence, Lord proposed that proportionality does not require
uniform results in "superficially similar circumstances," and the
majority's search for exact matches is exactly what the "family
resemblance" approach was trying to avoid.128  The concurrence
advocated a less exacting approach to comparative proportionality
review, and argued that the "family resemblance" approach is only a
search for broad tendencies to insure that the "death penalty has been
imposed generally and not 'wantonly and freakishly."
1 29
Finally, in a powerful dissenting opinion, Justice Utter argued that
Benn's sentence of death was disproportionate. 3 ' In his search for
similar cases, Justice Utter quickly dismissed the "family resemblance"
approach as "not sound,""i3' and listed several factors which could
potentially make a case similar. These factors included the age of the
defendant and victim(s), the number of victims, the amount of
conscious suffering, the defendant's criminal record, and mitigating
circumstances. 132 Agreeing with the majority, Justice Utter excluded
young defendants, and those with mental defects, from his pool of
similar cases.' 33 He also did not include cases where the defendant
pleaded guilty."3
Justice Utter argued that one of the majority's similar cases should
not have been included in the majority's pool of similar cases. 3 '
That case involved an eighteen year old named Hazen who was
sentenced to death for murdering two of his neighbors.'36 First,
because Hazen committed suicide in prison, his death sentence was
never reviewed, making its reliability questionable.'37 Second, Justice
Utter found Hazen's crime to be more brutal and involve more
aggravating factors than Benn's. 38 Finally, because the majority
128. Id. at 695-96, 845 P.2d at 325. For a further discussion of the "family resemblance"
approach see supra text accompanying notes 93-97.
129. Id. at 696, 845 P.2d at 325.
130. Id. at 709, 845 P.2d at 332 (Utter, J., dissenting). Justice Utter's dissent was joined
by two other justices, Smith and Johnson. Id. at 712, 845 P.2d at 334.
131. Id. at 699, 845 P.2d at 327. Justice Utter said that "[tihe majority in this case correctly
refers to the family resemblance approach as impressionistic. A better approach would be for us
to focus initially on a few salient factors in this case in developing a pool of similar cases." Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. Justice Utter was hesitant to exclude these cases and pointed out that the majority
had cited no authority that supports excluding cases where the defendant had pleaded guilty. Id.
135. Id. at 700, 845 P.2d at 327.
136. Id. at 683-84, 845 P.2d 319.




excluded other young murderers who did not receive the death penalty
from the pool of similar cases, Hazen's inclusion was inconsistent.'39
Additionally, Justice Utter decided that the majority failed to
include fifteen post-1981 cases that were similar to Benn's, 40 two of
which were not even mentioned by the majority as potentially similar
cases.141 In all fifteen of these cases, the defendants were sentenced
to life without the possibility of parole.'42 Next, after criticizing the
majority's failure to consider pre-1981 cases, Justice Utter concluded
that six pre-1981 cases were similar to Benn's.'43 One of the defen-
dants in these cases was sentenced to death.'"
Of the twenty-seven total cases deemed by Justice Utter to be
similar to Benn's, only three defendants were sentenced to death.
14
If only post-1981 cases are considered, the ratio is even lower (two of
twenty-one). 146  Applying the often cited rule that a sentence is
proportionate if it is "imposed 'generally' in similar cases," Justice
Utter argued that the term "generally" means significantly more than
fifty percent. 147 Clearly, three sentences of death out of twenty-seven
similar cases does not meet this standard.
The results obtained by the majority, concurrence, and dissent, in
the application of comparative proportionality review, were shockingly
dissimilar. The majority found seven similar cases of which three
defendants were sentenced to death. 41 In stark contrast, the dissent
139. Id.
140. Id. at 700, 845 P.2d at 328.
141. The majority opinion did not consider the Stephen Carey or the George Russell cases
to see if they were similar to Benn's. See id. at 701-03, 845 P.2d 328-29.
142. Id. at 701, 845 P.2d at 328.
143. Id. at 704, 845 P.2d at 330. Justice Utter acknowledged that there are inherent
problems in using pre-1981 cases. Id. at 705, 845 P.2d at 330. These problems include the lack
of detailed information to make comparisons, and the fact that Washington's pre-1981 death
sentence statute was unconstitutional. Id.
144. Id. at 704, 845 P.2d at 330.
145. Id. at 705, 845 P.2d at 330.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 706, 845 P.2d at 331. Justice Utter disagreed with the majority's approach:
The majority fails to address the issue of whether the death penalty has been generally
applied in similar cases. It simply inquires whether there is an "arbitrary frequency of
life without parole sentences over death sentences" among cases similar to Benn's. It
cites no authority for this approach, and gives no reasons for departing from the
standard we and other states with similar statutes have adopted.
Id. (citations omitted). Justice Utter argued that the majority's version of proportionality review
is inconsistent with that employed by North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Georgia, all of which
have virtually identical comparative proportionality review statutes to Washington's. Id. "In
these other states, the death penalty is deemed proportionate if it is applied in the vast majority
of similar cases." Id.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 110-25.
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found twenty-seven similar cases where three defendants were
sentenced to death. 49 Finally, the concurrence discussed zero similar
cases, but argued that there was a "family resemblance" between
Benn's crime and others where the sentence of death was imposed.15
It seems unlikely that a procedure that can be so easily manipulated to
achieve any result adds to the prospects of an evenhanded and rational
application of the death sentence. The disparity in judiciary opinion
found in Benn hints at some of the deep rooted flaws in the court's
current application of comparative proportionality review.
V. PROBLEMS WITH THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT'S
APPLICATION OF COMPARATIVE PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
A. Procedural Problems With Proportionality Review
A key issue to comparative proportionality review is how the court
should choose a group of similar cases, as a defendant's life literally
depends upon the justices' proclivities for finding "similar cases." The
legislature has not provided any guidance in determining what features
make a case similar."' Therefore, the court has been left with the
duty of developing a process that comports with the legislature's
general intentions in enacting comparative proportionality review.'
149. See supra text accompanying notes 130-47.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 126-29.
151. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(2)(b) (1994).
152. Several commentators have suggested changes in procedures that would improve
comparative proportionality review. For the most part, these commentators have focused on the
problem of finding similar cases for comparison, and have suggested that by carefully categorizing
the various factors of all potentially similar cases, a court performing comparative proportionality
review could create a set methodology for determining what cases are similar and whether an
individual case is proportionate. This would dearly limit judiciary discretion in determining
whether a sentence was proportionate. See W. Ward Morrison, Jr., Comment, Washington's
Comparative Proportionality Review: Toward Effective Appellate Review of Death Penalty Cases
Under the Washington State Constitution, 64 WASH. L. REV. 111 (1989) (criticizing the way
proportionality review is conducted in Washington and advocating the formulation of specific
guidelines); David Baldus & George Woodworth, Proportionality: The View of the Special Master,
CHANCE, Summer 1993, at 9. But see Herbert I. Weisberg, Proportionality: An Alternative
View, CHANCE, Summer 1993, at 18.
One of the most interesting attempts at defining a procedure for comparative proportionality
review was undertaken by the New Jersey Supreme Court. See Baldus and Woodworth, supra.
In anticipation of conducting comparative proportionality review, a special master was appointed
by the New Jersey Supreme Court to recommend various procedural methods. Id. at 9. After
completing extensive research on death sentence cases, the special master categorized various
factors that were indicative of culpability and moral blameworthiness. Id. at 12. Several different
statistical methods, including multiple discriminant analysis, were used to reach a conclusion as
to the proportionality of a defendant's death sentence. Id. at 13. In conclusion, the special master
found that the methods developed would be useful, and would at least "expose to the light of day
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Comparative proportionality review was included in Washington's
statutory scheme to help rectify the procedural flaws found in the
unconstitutional pre-Furman death penalty statutes.5 3
Unfortunately, the Washington Supreme Court has neither
developed nor articulated a process that adequately safeguards
defendants from arbitrary death sentences. The method of comparative
proportionality review that the court currently utilizes is in and of itself
extremely arbitrary and susceptible to misuse." In fact, it is
difficult to conceive of a scenario in which a judge could not find a
sentence of death proportionate. Only extremely heinous crimes can
ever reach the stage in which the penalty of death is an option. 5
And because there is a relatively large group of potentially similar
cases, a judge can always find superficially similar cases to rationalize
a finding of proportionality. With so little legislative guidance as to
what makes a sentence proportionate, the judges are essentially allowed
to decide for themselves the fate of a particular defendant. The
Washington Supreme Court's application of comparative proportionali-
ty review is as arbitrary as a jury's sentence, and therefore, is not
presently a viable tool to prevent an arbitrary death sentence.
the decision-making process in individual cases that, in most states, is largely opaque." Id. at 17.
153. State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 908, 822 P.2d 177, 222 (1991), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 164 (1992).
154. For the purposes of this Comment, the term "misuse" is used to indicate that a judge
can use comparative proportionality review to reach any conclusion he or she wishes, even if based
on impermissible reasons. For example, even if a jury has arbitrarily sentenced a defendant to
die while many similarily situated defendants were sentenced to life in prison, if a judge wishes
to uphold the defendant's sentence of death, for whatever reason, comparative proportionality
review, as currently applied, would not provide a meaningful safeguard to the defendant.
155. By creating a statutory scheme in which death is a possible penalty for certain crimes,
the legislature has already determined that the penalty of death is appropriate for the crime
committed. One of the main problems pointed to by the Furman court was that juries had
uncontrolled discretion to decide the fate of an individual defendant. See supra text accompanying
notes 24-36. This left states with two options to correct their death penalty statutes. First, as
discussed in this Comment, states could develop various procedures to guide and limit jury
discretion. Second, states could make the penalty of death mandatory for certain classes of crimes.
In Woodson v. North Carolina, the U.S. Supreme Court found unconstitutional a statute that made
the death penalty mandatory for those convicted of "any ... kind of willful, deliberate and
premeditated killing." 428 U.S. 280, 286 (1976) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp.
1975)). The opinion noted that the unique nature of the death penalty required that applicable
defendants be given individualized consideration. Id. at 303-05. Washington also briefly
experimented with a mandatory death penalty statute for certain types of first degree murder. See
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.046 (1975). After Woodson, the Washington Supreme Court held
that this statute was unconstitutional. State v. Green, 91 Wash. 2d 431, 446-47, 588 P.2d 1370,
1379 (1979).
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In ten opportunities to find a sentence disproportionate, the court
has never done so.156 This bare statistic hints at some of the prob-
lems with the court's current process of gathering a pool of similar
cases. The next section will discuss some of these problems, along
with some of the mistakes the court has made.
1. Inconsistencies in Choosing Similar Cases
The failure of the Washington Supreme Court to develop a
consistent procedure for selecting a pool of similar cases has led to
inconsistencies and unfairness to individual defendants. Many of the
difficulties associated with choosing similar cases are closely related to
the problem of finding a sufficient number of similar cases. Clearly,
one "very" similar case alone is not sufficient to find a case proportion-
ate or disproportionate. A lone case could be disproportionate itself,
or some factor, unforeseen by the judges, may actually distinguish the
case. The chance of this type of error is reduced by choosing a larger
sample of similar cases.
But when one chooses a large sample of similar cases, because of
the relative infrequency of aggravated murder and the fact-specific
nature of the crime, it becomes easy to manipulate the process of
choosing similar cases. In other words, when the judiciary has a large
amount of discretion in choosing similar cases due to the necessity of
obtaining a fairly large group of similar cases, it becomes increasingly
easy to choose similar cases based on impermissible reasons. Upon
examining the court's methodology for selecting similar cases, it is
difficult to escape the conclusion that their decisions are often
influenced by whether the justices are for, or against, capital punish-
ment.15 7
156. See supra note 98. The Supreme Court found the sentence of death proportionate in
all of these cases.
157. While justices are certainly entitled to an opinion on capital punishment, their opinions
should not be relevant for implementing comparative proportionality review. The court has a
statutory duty to compare a given death sentence with "similar" cases. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.95.100 (1994). It is a violation of this duty to let one's personal feelings on capital
punishment interfere with this selection process. The Washington Legislature enacted
Washington's death penalty statute to make sure that the death penalty was, as constitutionally
required, handed out in an evenhanded and fair manner. See supra text accompanying notes 37-
57. Allowing subjective biases to creep into the selection process is dearly a violation of the
requirement to be evenhanded. Additionally, the Washington Supreme Court should not be
influenced by a desired result because comparative proportionality review was developed, at least
partially, as a response to the Furman court's concern about excess judge and jury discretion. See
supra text accompanying notes 24-36. Comparing a given death sentence to similar cases
supposedly creates an objective procedure, uninfluenced by the biases of judge or jury, to
determine if the sentence is appropriate. Comparative proportionality review will not be applied
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There are several ways in which the Washington Supreme Court
has manipulated the process of selecting similar cases. It is common
for the justices to focus on a certain characteristic of the defendant that
makes a death sentence unlikely. For example, the youth of the
defendant is a powerful mitigating circumstance, and is almost certainly
a common reason for a jury to grant leniency.
In Benn, where the defendant was middle-aged, the majority
excluded young defendants who did not receive the death penalty from
its pool of similar cases."' 8 This decision rested on the premise that
these cases were not similar, due to the young age of the defendants.
And then, without any explanation, the majority included in its pool
of similar cases a case where an eighteen-year-old named Hazen was
sentenced to death." 9 As Justice Utter pointed out in the dissent,
this is simply inconsistent.' 6 When cases are excluded from the
pool of similar cases solely because of a certain factor, all cases that
have that factor must be excluded.16 ' By excluding all young defen-
dants who did not receive the death penalty from the pool of similar
cases, the majority was essentially saying that when a young defendant
is sentenced to death it is disproportionate. When the majority
included Hazen, they were using a disproportionate case to prove
proportionality. The only plausible reason that the Hazen case was
included by the majority was to make Benn's sentence appear more
proportionate.
This is an extreme example of how the selection of similar cases
may be manipulated to avoid invalidating a jury-imposed death
sentence. But because it is easy to make factual distinctions among
heinous crimes, this error is committed to a lesser degree all too
objectively if judges are influenced by their personal beliefs about capital punishment.
158. Benn, 120 Wash. 2d at 691, 845 P.2d at 323 (majority opinion).
159. Id. at 692, 845 P.2d at 323.
160. Id. at 700, 845 P.2d at 327 (Utter, J., dissenting).
161. It may be useful to examine a hypothetical at this point. Assume that there are three
defendants who have committed identical crimes. Defendant 1 (or case 1) is 45 years old, and
was recently sentenced to death by a jury. Defendant 2 (or case 2) is 13 years old and was
sentenced to life in prison for his or her crime. Defendant 3 (or case 3), on the other hand, is also
13 years old, but was sentenced to death. The Washington Supreme Court is performing
comparative proportionality review for defendant 1, and defendant's 2 and 3 are both potentially
similar cases.
The court might very well conclude that case 2 is not similar to case 1. In other words, since
defendant 2 was so young, as opposed to defendant 1, the court could find that this mitigating
factor distinguishes the two cases. But in doing so, the court cannot then turn around and find
that case 3 is similar to case 1. Defendant 3 has the same mitigating circumstance as defendant
2, and therefore, would not have been included in the pool of similar cases if he had been
sentenced to life. Including defendant 3 in the pool of similar cases unfairly biases the pool in
favor of finding a sentence proportionate.
1995]
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frequently. Interestingly, Justice Utter made the same mistake just
paragraphs after criticizing the majority. In developing his own pool
of similar cases, he found fifteen "similar" murders, several of which
"were much more brutal [than Benn's murder], involving substantial
conscious suffering before death."'1 62 But if this was true, these cases
should not have been included in his pool of similar cases. Presum-
ably, due to the "more brutal" character of these crimes, Justice Utter
would not have found these cases similar if the defendants had been
sentenced to death.163 This is inconsistent and biases the pool of
similar cases in favor of finding a sentence disproportionate.'"
Another problem with the method the court uses to choose similar
cases is the entirely arbitrary manner in which the court deals with
mitigating circumstances. Since Washington's comparative proportion-
ality review statute requires that the court consider "the defen-
dant, 1 6'  a defendant's mitigating circumstances may be used to
distinguish potential similar cases. 66  State v. Rupe 67 is a good
example of this process.
Mitchell Rupe was convicted of killing two females during a bank
robbery, and was sentenced to death. 6 It is hard to imagine a
defendant with a greater number of mitigating circumstances. During
162. Benn, 120 Wash. 2d at 701, 845 P.2d at 328 (Utter, J., dissenting).
163. Since it is impossible to find exactly similar cases, it is not always inconsistent for more
brutal cases to be included in the pool of similar cases. Cases where defendants commit more
brutal murders must be treated consistently. In other words, the suitability for a case's inclusion
in the pool of similar cases should not depend upon whether or not that defendant received the
death penalty. But if cases are truly distinguishable because of their more brutal nature, they
should not be included in the pool of similar cases. This is because it biases the pool in favor of
making a sentence disproportionate to include "more brutal" crimes when the defendant is
sentenced to life, and not to include "more brutal" crimes when the defendant is sentenced to
death.
The problem of being consistent inherently conflicts with making sure that there is an
adequate number of similar cases. For example, if you eliminate all potentially similar cases
where the crime is slightly more brutal than the crime committed by the defendant, the pool of
similar cases may be so small as to make any decision based on such a pool unreliable. The short
answer to this problem is that a court may use cases that are slightly more or less brutal than the
defendant's when it is necessary to obtain a sufficient number of cases, and all such cases are
included in the pool. This is dearly less than a perfect solution because even the inclusion of all
such cases will bias the pool in one direction or the other.
164. There probably were cases that were "more brutal" than Benn's where the defendant
was sentenced to death, that did not get into Justice Utter's pool of similar cases because of their
more brutal nature. In fact, Justice Utter claimed that Hazen should not be included in the pool
of similar cases at least partially on the basis that his crime was "much more brutal." Benn, 120
Wash. 2d at 699, 845 P.2d at 327 (Utter, J., dissenting).
165. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.070 (1994).
166. See id.
167. 108 Wash. 2d 734, 743 P.2d 210 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061 (1988).
168. Id. at 738, 743 P.2d at 214.
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Rupe's sentencing hearing, approximately fifty people testified on
Rupe's behalf.6 9 These included friends and co-workers that he had
known for his entire life. Rupe was well-liked and involved in many
activities, including the Boy Scouts, the Civil Air Patrol, and the
Mason County Search and Rescue Council.17  He had served
throughout the world in the army, had never committed a prior crime,
and the dissent argued that there was strong evidence that Rupe was
mentally disturbed.' 7' While the majority acknowledged that Rupe's
background was uncommon for those sentenced to die, they neverthe-
less found the sentence proportionate.' 72 The court did not even
discuss the fact that far more mitigating circumstances existed in
Rupe's case than in any other case where proportionality review was
performed.
While there is nothing inherently wrong with finding Rupe's
sentence proportionate, it is interesting that powerful mitigating
circumstances had no effect. In Benn, there were few mitigating
circumstances,' 73 and the court used this fact to distinguish, and thus
eliminate from comparison, several potentially similar cases where the
defendant did not receive the death penalty. 7' This is an example
of the court unfairly applying comparative proportionality review.
While a defendant's mitigating circumstances appear to be almost
irrelevant for finding his own sentence disproportionate, they are
readily used to distinguish cases in which the death sentence was not
imposed.
Additionally, when a case like Rupe is used as a similar case, the
court must be very careful to remain consistent. Benn exemplifies this
potential problem. Presumably, Benn's lack of mitigating circumstan-
ces eliminated several cases with mitigating circumstances from the
majority's pool of similar cases. For example, if a defendant who had
considerable mitigating circumstances did not receive the death penalty,
169. Id. at 780, 743 P.2d at 235 (Pearson, C.J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 780, 743 P.2d at 235-36.
171. Id. at 782, 743 P.2d at 236-37.
172. Id. at 770, 743 P.2d at 230. Rupe was 27 years old; therefore, he did not have the
mitigating circumstance of youthfulness. Additionally, it is certainly conceivable that a crime
could be so outrageous that any amount of mitigation would not matter. For example, if three
children are raped, tortured, and killed, the sentence of death would probably be proportionate
regardless of the mitigating factors offered (except perhaps the age of the defendant). See State
v. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d 1, 838 P.2d 86 (1992). Rupe was not such a case. Only three
aggravating factors were present, and the victims did not undergo any conscious suffering. Rupe,
108 Wash. 2d at 783, 743 P.2d at 237 (Pearson, C.J., dissenting).
173. 120 Wash. 2d at 678, 845 P.2d at 316.
174. Id. at 690-91, 845 P.2d at 322-23. Mitigating circumstances can also make two cases
similar. Id. at 684, 845 P.2d at 319.
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Benn's lack of mitigating circumstances could be used to distinguish
the former case. In Benn, Rupe is used as a similar case in which the
defendant was sentenced to death. 7 s The use of Rupe in Benn is
inconsistent if a case identical to Rupe, except that the defendant did
not receive the death penalty, would have been excluded from the
majority's pool of similar cases based on the differing amounts of
mitigation. This asymmetrical application of mitigating circumstances
is inconsistent and unfairly biases the pool of similar cases in favor of
finding a sentence proportionate.
Some of the arguments used by the court to rationalize the
grouping of similar cases are simply not credible.176 And upon
175. Id. at 692, 845 P.2d at 323.
176. For example, in Rupe, the court distinguished a potentially similar case on the grounds
that only one juror did not vote for the death penalty. Rupe, 108 Wash. 2d at 769, 743 P.2d at
229. Surely, this is not a permissible means to distinguish a case, for our criminal justice system
requires juror unanimity. Another questionable argument is used in Rice. The defendant in Rice
suffered from a mental illness, and in distinguishing two cases where mentally ill defendants did
not receive the death penalty, the court stated "it is difficult to determine the extent to which the
defendants' mental disturbance caused the juries to grant leniency; thus, they are not very useful
as comparison cases for the issue at hand." Rice, 110 Wash. 2d at 627, 757 P.2d at 916. This
logic, taken to an extreme, would eliminate all consideration of mitigating circumstances from the
selection of similar cases. For it is never possible to know precisely why a jury granted leniency,
and it is not acceptable to use this excuse to distinguish potentially similar cases.
Another example involves Rupe and Rice. Due to the time delay between the trial court's
sentencing decision and the mandatory appellate review of death penalty cases, both Rupe and
Rice were sentenced to death at the trial court level before either sentence was reviewed at the
appellate level. The court in Rice used the Rupe case as a similar case where the death penalty
was imposed. Rice, 110 Wash. 2d at 625-26, 757 P.2d at 915. The court in Rope used the Rice
case as a similar case were the death penalty was imposed. Rape, 108 Wash. 2d at 768, 743 P.2d
at 229. This "bootstrapping" is dearly impermissible as it results in two cases, in and of
themselves, making each other proportionate.
Recently, a federal district court concluded that the Washington Supreme Court performed
an inadequate proportionality review and thereby violated the defendant's due process tights.
Harris v. Blodgett, 853 F. Supp. 1239 (W.D. Wash. 1994), amending and superseding State v.
Harris, 106 Wash. 2d 784, 725 P.2d 975 (1986). This case involved a defendant named Harris
who was convicted of soliciting a killing and was sentenced to death. When the Washington
Supreme Court performed comparative proportionality review, it stated that there were no similar
cases where the death penalty was considered for a solicited killing. Id. at 1288.
The district court was troubled by several aspects of the Washington Supreme Court's
decision. First, the district court acknowledged that Washington's death penalty statute does not
define a similar case and it is difficult to ascertain what makes a case similar. The district court
asked what factors can be considered in determining whether a case is similar. "What about age?
Race? Sex? Pregnancy?... Disability? Mental Status? Diminished capacity? Emotional status?
Competence of counsel? Delay in prosecution? Motive? Acquittals of co-defendants?" Id. at
1289. Second, the district court noted that there was no procedure for the parties to be notified
as to which cases the court may consider similar until the parties received the court's ultimate
decision. Id. Next, the district court noted that the death penalty statute provided for no
alternative procedures if no similar cases could be found, and did not give a standard for
reviewing selected cases. Id. The district court asked why several solicitation cases where the
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reading several opinions, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the
lack of any consistent procedure makes a mockery of the idea of
disciplined proportionality review. While one might argue that the
best type of appellate review would be for the justices to simply decide
if they believe the sentence of death is appropriate, Furman required
more than this. One of the key flaws that compelled the U.S. Supreme
Court to find several death penalty statutes unconstitutional was
unguided jury and judge discretion.'77 The Washington Supreme
Court's failure to apply any consistent procedures to choosing similar
cases has resulted in comparative proportionality review where judges
have unguided discretion and may almost choose similar cases at will.
The Washington Supreme Court's failure to develop a consistent
procedure is a direct result of never defining what objectives compara-
tive proportionality review should address.
B. Substantive Purpose of Proportionality Review
The Washington Supreme Court has never clearly defined what
makes a sentence proportionate. To do so, it must first determine
what objectives are being furthered by comparative proportionality
review.
One possible objective of comparative proportionality review is to
safeguard the defendant who has received an aberrational sentence
compared to a group of similarly situated defendants. That is, there
should not be instances when a defendant has been sentenced to death,
while many (perhaps ten) defendants who have committed the same
type of crime under similar circumstances have been given more
lenient sentences. This Comment will refer to this possible objective
as the "outlier" case.
178
death penalty was not sought were not compared to Harris' caae, and noted, "[a]t best, this
analysis appears superficial and incomplete" Id. Finally, after commenting that the majority
simply listed reasons why the death penalty was not "freakishly imposed," without actually
comparing facts to similar cases, the court stated "the majority decision can be characterized as
a traditional review, rather than a comparative review." Id. at 1289-90; see infra note 189. In
sum, the district court concluded that the Washington Supreme Court had not fulfilled "the
essential function of ensuring the 'evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition of death
sentences .... Id. at 1291 (citing Campbell v. Blodgett, 997 F.2d 512, 522 n.12 (9th Cir.
1992)).
177. Furman, 408 U.S. at 314; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-05.
178. An outlier has been defined as "an observation that does not conform to the pattern
established by other observations." RICHARD 0. GILBERT, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION MONITORING 186 (1987) (quoting W.F. HUNT, JR., ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
INTRA-AGENCY TASK FORCE REPORT ON AIR QUALITY INDICATORS, EPA-450/4-81-015
(1981)). This is analogous to its use in this Comment, because the "outlier" case deals with death
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Another possible objective of comparative proportionality review
is to safeguard the individual who has been sentenced to death, while
the majority (fifty-one percent) of the defendants committing the same
type of crime have not. Clearly, fewer defendants would be sentenced
to death under this scheme than the "outlier" case. This Comment will
refer to this second possible objective of comparative proportionality
review as the "majority" case.
Comparative proportionality review in Washington realistically
addresses only the "outlier" case. This is shown in Benn, where the
majority's pool of similar cases includes three of seven defendants
sentenced to death.'79 Since three of seven is less than fifty-one
percent, the court obviously is not attempting to solve the "majority"
case. Additionally, only the "outlier" case defendant would have any
practical chance of having the court reduce his sentence by way of
comparative proportionality review. The procedural defects discussed
earlier insure that only in the "outlier" case will justices be at all
constrained to find enough similar cases to find a sentence of death
proportionate.180
Post-Furman death penalty statutes must promote the evenhanded,
nonarbitrary application of the death sentence.' Specifically, the
Furman court was concerned with discrimination, the lack of legislative
guidance, and a rational means for distinguishing the few who receive
the death penalty and those who do not." 2 Each of these specific
concerns will be examined in the following sections. By determining
which of the two possible objectives of comparative proportionality
review are more in line with the concerns of the Furman court, it
becomes clear that Washington's review must change.
sentences that do not conform to the sentences of other similarly situated defendants.
179. Benn, 120 Wash. 2d at 692, 845 P.2d at 323.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 153-56. In Benn, the majority found three of seven
similar cases where the death sentence was imposed. The dissent found three of twenty-seven.
See supra notes 148-50. If the process can be this easily manipulated, only the defendant who is
sentenced to death, where the vast majority of similarly situated defendants are not, could have
any expectation that the Washington Supreme Court would find his sentence disproportionate.





Comparative proportionality review that strives only to rectify the
"outlier" case does not address discriminatory application of the death
penalty. This can be seen more clearly through the use of a hypotheti-
cal. Suppose a jury sentences a poor African-American to death, while
under similar circumstances a Caucasian-American would have
received life in prison. With a large pool of superficially similar cases,
the court could almost certainly find two or three similar cases from
which to conclude that the death sentence was proportionate.'83 But
since only two or three similar cases are required, it seems very
possible that these cases themselves could have been based on
discrimination.
This problem is magnified for two reasons. First, because
Washington's death penalty statute defines similar cases as those being
reported since 1965, ' " many potentially similar death penalty cases
were decided under an unconstitutional death penalty statute.
Therefore, if you assume some of these unconstitutional pre-Furman
cases were influenced by discrimination, then it is likely that there are
cases based on discrimination which could potentially be used to find
a sentence proportionate."8 5 Second, there is no room for error in the
present system. If two or three discriminatory death sentences pass
judicial scrutiny, like a few bad apples fouling the barrel, they will
enter the domain of potentially similar cases, where they may be used
in perpetuity to affirm the proportionality of other discriminatory death
sentences.
If comparative proportionality review is used to address the
"majority" case, discriminatory death sentences will be reduced. In
order to meet the fifty-one percent requirement, in any given group of
similar cases, the "majority" case will require more similar cases in
183. See Benn, 120 Wash. 2d at 682-92, 845 P.2d at 318-23. In thirty multiple-murder
cases, the court found only three similar cases where the defendant was sentenced to death.
Twenty-three of the multiple-murder cases in which the defendants were not sentenced to death
were found dissimilar. This was enough for the majority to find the sentence proportionate. Id.
184. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(2Xb) (1994); see Benn, 120 Wash. 2d at 705, 845 P.2d
at 330 (Utter, J., dissenting).
185. This is probably a relatively minor problem. The majority opinion in Benn does not
use any pre- 1981 cases in determining whether the death sentence is proportionate. See Benn, 120
Wash. 2d at 704, 845 P.2d at 329 (Utter, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, the legislature should
amend the proportionality statute to make sure that judges do not use pre-Furman cases to prove
proportionality.
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which the defendant was sentenced to death than the "outlier"
case. 186  If more cases are required, then the results will not be so
easily influenced by a few cases decided in a discriminatory fashion.
2. Jury Discretion
The Furman court pointed to excessive jury discretion as yet
another flaw in the application of pre-1972 death penalty statutes.
Comparative proportionality review is one way that Washington's
death penalty statute limits jury discretion. 8 7  It does so by giving
the court the power to overturn jury decisions when they are dispro-
portionate to similar cases. As described below, excessive jury
discretion could be further limited if comparative proportionality
review addressed the "majority" case.
In either the "outlier" case or the "majority" case, judges have the
power to alter "aberrational" death sentences. So in this sense, both
types of cases limit jury discretion to some degree. Clearly, the
"majority" case would further limit jury discretion because a court
needs more similar cases in which the defendant was sentenced to
death to uphold a death sentence.
The Washington Supreme Court has been reluctant to use
comparative proportionality review to take the sentencing decision out
of the jury's hands. As the majority stated in Benn, "[w]e have not
sought to substitute this court's judgment for that of the jury."'88
This statement apparently indicates that the majority believes that jury
autonomy is a valid reason for a reduced role for comparative
proportionality review. This is simply wrong. The jury has not
decided the issue of comparative proportionality review. The jury has
never made a factual determination on the proportionality of the
186. This point can be illustrated by examining Benn, where there were three defendants
sentenced to death in seven similar cases. See Benn, 120 Wash. 2d at 692, 845 P.2d at 323. Since
three sentences of death out of seven similar cases (forty-three percent) does not make a sentence
of death an aberration, the defendant's sentence of death should be found proportionate under the
"outlier" case. In the "majority" case, four sentences of death in seven similar cases would be
required to find a sentence proportionate. Under the "majority" case, since forty-three percent
is less than fifty-one percent, the court would have found Benn's sentence of death disproportion-
ate. Clearly, more cases in which the defendant received the death penalty are required to find
a sentence proportionate using the "majority" case than the "outlier" case.
187. Jury discretion may also be limited by requiring aggravating circumstances, bifurcated
proceedings, mandatory appellate review, and separate consideration of mitigating circumstances.
See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.95.020., .050, .070, .100 (1994).
188. Benn, 120 Wash. 2d at 693, 845 P.2d at 324. This is another indication that the
Washington Supreme Court's application of comparative proportionality review only addresses




sentence. They have looked at no similar cases, and are presumably
basing their decision solely on the facts of their individual case. While
the presumption that a jury sentence is valid is relevant to whether the
defendant deserves to die, or any other factual determination that the
jury has been asked to decide, comparative proportionality review is
not such a determination. Furthermore, comparative proportionality
review is not making a value judgment on whether the jury was
"wrong,''... it is simply determining whether similarly situated
defendants have been similarly sentenced to die. Comparative
proportionality review is unrelated to any decision that the jury has
made.
Jury discretion would be reduced if the Washington Supreme
Court stopped deferring to the jury's ultimate decision on whether the
sentence of death is warranted when the court performs comparative
proportionality review. Additionally, adopting the "majority" case
objective would further limit jury discretion by raising the standard of
when a sentence is proportionate.
189. There is a distinction between traditional proportionality review and comparative
proportionality review of a death sentence. Traditional proportionality review asks whether a
given sentence is appropriate for a particular crime. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 42-43. Comparative
proportionality review inquires into whether the death penalty in a particular case is unacceptable
because disproportionate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same crime. Id.
at 43. In fact, comparative proportionality review presumes that the death sentence is not
traditionally disproportionate. Id.
The legislature, in writing a death penalty statute, has already determined that the
punishment of death is traditionally proportionate for the crime of aggravated murder. Thus, the
jury cannot be "wrong" in sentencing to death a defendant who has committed such a crime.
However, comparative proportionality review is a separate issue from anything that the jury has
been asked to decide, and should be treated as such by the Washington Supreme Court.
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3. Distinguishing Those Who Receive the Death
Penalty From Those Who Do Not
The infrequency of modem day executions led the Furman-court
to conclude that no rational basis existed for distinguishing the few
who were sentenced to death from those who were not.190 Because
comparative proportionality review is the one procedural safeguard that
allows comparisons with other cases, it is uniquely capable of
addressing this problem.
The "outlier" case objective protects defendants whose sentences
of death were an aberration. But just because a sentence of death is
not an aberration does not make a defendant's sentence distinguishable
from others who did not receive the death penalty. The "majority"
case, on the other hand, provides a meaningful basis for distinguishing
between those who live and those who die. If a majority of similarly
situated defendants receive the death sentence, the very fact that the
defendant is among this majority provides the meaningful basis for his
sentence. In other words, the defendant will not be placed in a
situation where he is sentenced to death and five equally culpable
defendants are not. The fact that under the "majority" case, a
defendant sentenced to die will be similarly situated with similar
defendants, at least means that a rational explanation can be made as
to why a particular defendant has been chosen to die.
In sum, the "majority" case approach approximates the objectives
of the Furman court much more closely than the "outlier" case
approach. While Washington's death penalty statute is probably
facially constitutional, the Washington legislature adopted the current
statute in response to the constitutional infirmities identified by the
Furman court. 191 Thus, to comply with the legislature's intentions,
and as a matter of basic fairness to those sentenced to death, Washing-
ton must alter its application of comparative proportionality review.
Comparative proportionality review that addresses the "majority" case
190. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring). Justice White stated:
[Aind I can do no more than state a conclusion based on 10 years of almost daily
exposure to the facts and circumstances of hundreds and hundreds of federal and state
criminal cases involving crimes for which death is the authorized penalty. That
conclusion, as I have said, is that the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency
even for the most atrocious crimes and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguish-
ing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.
Id.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 37-57.
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would go a long way towards solving many of the Furman-related
problems.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is time for the Washington Supreme Court to change its
method of conducting comparative proportionality review. The court
should implement the "majority" case by unequivocally declaring that
a death sentence will be found proportionate only if a majority of
similar cases have been decided the same way.19 2  The court must
change the focus of comparative proportionality review from safeguard-
ing the rare case when a jury decision is an aberration, to a means for
protecting defendants given inequitable sentences.
Comparative proportionality review should be affirmatively and
liberally used to insure that no Washington defendant will be
sentenced to die arbitrarily. The review needs to become a barrier that
must be surmounted if the state wishes to execute one of its citizens.
Those sentenced to die deserve more out of comparative proportionali-
ty review than a meaningless pooling of "similar cases," where the
result of proportionality is a foregone conclusion. Perhaps all that this
Comment advocates is that the court recognize the potential of
comparative proportionality review to answer many of the problems in
today's death penalty cases.
192. One result that might occur by categorically adopting the "majority" case is the freezing
of the status quo. For example, if juries represent the current views of society, it seems
inappropriate to overturn a jury sentence based on past cases; it is possible that society's opinions
have changed since the jury from the past made its decision. While this argument can be used
against any form of comparative proportionality review, it is particularly applicable for the
"majority" case. This is because the "majority" case does more than attempt to reign in an
aberrant jury, but tries to create a means for distinguishing those who are sentenced to death and
those who are not. The "majority" case would make it impossible for a jury to expand the death
penalty based on the changing mores of society.
There are several counter arguments to this premise. First, since the death penalty is
inherently different from any other type of penalty, perhaps the Eighth Amendment's guarantee
against cruel and unusual punishment requires procedures that insure that the death penalty will
never be inflicted arbitrarily. The "majority" case version of comparative proportionality review
may come as dose as any procedure can, absent the elimination of the death penalty, to making
this guarantee. Justice Marshall hinted at the difficulty of eliminating the systematic defects that
were present in Furman, and said that "the task of eliminating arbitrariness in the infliction of
capital punishment is proving to be one which our criminal justice system--and perhaps any
criminal justice system is unable to perform." Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 440 (1980)
(Marshall, J., concurring).
Second, the "majority" case would only freeze the status quo in one direction. In other
words, juries would still be perfectly capable of further limiting the application of the death
penalty. If you assume that society will one day conclude that there is a better means of dealing
with society's worst criminals than killing them, it is not inappropriate to restrict juries from
sentencing defendants to death.
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The procedural framework for determining which cases are
"similar," illustrated in the Benn majority opinion, is satisfactory, but
the court must pay more attention to fairness and detail. While
judicial discretion in this area may not be entirely advisable, the
alternative of a formalistic grouping and categorizing of cases is either
unfair or unworkable.193 Simply stated, assuming one could develop
a procedure that defines when a case is similar and when one is not,
such a procedure would only lead to unfairness in individual cases.1 94
The "family resemblance" approach to choosing similar cases,
advocated by the Benn concurrence, is unacceptable. Using vague
terminology such as "family resemblance" adds nothing to determining
whether an individual's sentence is similar to others, and seems
frighteningly close to simply allowing judges to decide if the sentence
of death is appropriate. Nonetheless, there are several ways that the
Washington Supreme Court can improve its current approach.
First of all, the court must adhere to and remain absolutely
consistent in its rationale. For example, if the court decides that a case
in which the defendant received life in prison is not similar solely
because of his youth, it cannot then turn around and use a young
defendant who was sentenced to death as a similar case.195 It is
absolutely essential that the court include specific explanations of why
certain cases were included or excluded to insure that the judiciary has
193. See supra note 152.
194. The categorical approach to finding similar cases is an apparent attempt to equate
procedural methodology with fairness. Commentators that advocate this approach assume that
a consistent procedure will result in a fair selection of similar cases. Unfortunately, it is simply
not possible to develop a procedure that can account for the infinite varieties of murder. For
example, even if the many varieties of murders could be categorized in terms that are indicative
of moral cuplability, there are ranges in each of these categories. For instance, the potential
category of victim suffering dearly presents a wide range of the possible amounts and degrees of
suffering.
It is impossible to imagine an equation that fairly defines proportionality. And it would be
the pinnacle of unfairness to develop a restrictive methodology for choosing similar cases that
could lead to less deserving defendants being sentenced to die. There is simply no way to get
around allowing discretion in the choosing of similar cases, so it does not make sense to artificially
force judges to work through procedures that add nothing to the prospects of fairness. Therefore,
neither the legislature nor the judiciary should develop a restrictive methodology for determining
when a case is similar. See generally Morrison, supra note 149, at 121 (the process of choosing
similar cases often involves "the comparison of incomparables").
195. This is an easy example of an often difficult problem. For example, maybe the
defendant who is sentenced to death, unlike the defendant serving life in prison, had a prior
criminal record. The court could use the defendant who is sentenced to death as a similar case
if it was the lack of criminal record that made the first case dissimilar. But the court must
consider these possibilities, for it is impermissible to include the defendant who is sentenced to




thought about the issue of consistency."' And while advocating that
the court remain consistent may be advocating the obvious, the court
has not been consistent in the past.197
Second, the court should strictly scrutinize whether the death
sentence is proportionate, and eliminate any presumption that the
jury's sentencing decision was correct. The jury's sentencing decision
is relevant to whether the defendant deserves to die, but has nothing
to do with the issue of comparative proportionality review. Allowing
judges to consider the jury's sentence is inconsistent with Furman.
Simply put, the problem of excessive jury discretion is not limited if
the court, in applying comparative proportionality review, gives
deference to a jury decision that is entirely unrelated to the issue of
comparative proportionality review.
Third, the court should make every effort to obtain a large pool
of similar cases. To do so, the court should only distinguish cases
based on broad categories that have a direct relationship to the moral
culpability of the actor. Torture, age of defendant, number of victims
and mental disturbance clearly fit under this category. Occasionally,
there may still be insufficient similar cases to have confidence in the
accuracy of the review. Under these circumstances, a court should use
cases in which the crime was objectively not as bad. 9' The pool of
similar cases will be biased in favor of finding a sentence dispropor-
196. It has been a common practice of the Washington Supreme Court to first list potentially
similar cases and then list the cases that actually are similar. See, e.g., Benn, 120 Wash. 2d at
692, 845 P.2d at 323. There is often little or no explanation of how certain cases got from one
list to the other or why certain cases were not included in the final list of similar cases. See id.
This practice is absolutely unacceptable. This vague style makes it virtually impossible to
determine what characteristics of a case lead to its inclusion or exclusion from the final pool of
similar cases.
This Comment advocates specific explanations of why cases are included or excluded from
the pool of similar cases. There are several reasons for this requirement. First, the requirement
insures that the justices will think about the issue of consistency. Second, it will allow attorneys
to determine why individual cases were included or excluded, making it possible in the future to
argue where the justices have made mistakes or have been logically inconsistent. Finally, a strict
explanation requirement addresses the Furman court's concern about excessive discretion by the
judiciary. In other words, it will be much more difficult for the judiciary to be motivated by a
desired result, or other impermissible reason, when they are forced to show their work.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 157-77.
198. For example, other factors being equal, a murder involving no torture is objectively not
as bad as a murder involving torture. While allowing judges to choose which cases are
"objectively not as bad" will allow the judiciary some discretion, it is the only alternative that does
not unfairly prejudice the defendant. If the court explains, in detail, why certain cases were
chosen as "similar," this will at least provide some assurance that the judiciary is remaining
consistent and fair.
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tionate, but this is a more acceptable result than using an unreliably
small sample size or biasing the sample to favor the death sentence.
If the Washington Supreme Court alters comparative proportion-
ality review in the manner described above, the review will be a
powerful tool that can be used to protect the constitutional rights of
defendants sentenced to death. The sentence of death is substantially
different from any other type of sentence. And because the penalty is
issued so rarely, in order to satisfy our basic notions of fairness, it
must be applied in an evenhanded manner. Bringing comparative
proportionality review to the forefront of determining when the
sentence of death is appropriate will help solve the problem of arbitrary
and unfair sentences of death.1
199. This Comment concludes that Benn's sentence of death was disproportionate compared
to the penalty imposed in similar cases. Without having the detailed factual record from which
to truly perform comparative proportionality review, it is nonetheless easy to find, even giving the
majority opinion the benefit of the doubt, that Benn's sentence was disproportionate.
The majority opinion in Benn found seven similar cases. Benn, 120 Wash. 2d at 692, 845
P.2d at 323. Three of these defendants were sentenced to death and at least two of these choices
were questionable. The majority in Benn clearly excluded several potentially similar cases on the
basis of the youth of the defendant. Id. at 691, 845 P.2d at 323. Including Hazen in the pool
of similar cases is inconsistent unless the majority can rationally distinguish Hazen from the
several young defendants left out of the pool of similar cases (Hazen was sentenced to death for
a crime committed at the age of 18). Additionally, Rupe, who was sentenced to death, was
included in the pool of similar cases despite considerable mitigating circumstances. Id. at 692,
845 P.2d at 323; see Rupe, 108 Wash. 2d at 780, 743 P.2d at 235 (Pearson, C.J., dissenting).
Since the majority considered mitigating circumstances relevant in including Jeffries as a similar
case, Benn, 120 Wash. 2d at 684, 845 P.2d at 319, the court needs to determine if Rupe would
have been distinguished from Benn, on the basis of mitigation, if Rupe would have received life
in prison. If so, Rupe is not a similar case.
The majority opinion also needs to discuss the four similar cases where the defendant was
sentenced to life in prison. See id. at 692, 845 P.2d at 323. For example, it is possible that the
crimes committed by these defendants were significantly "worse" than Benn's, and therefore,
would have been excluded from the pool of similar cases had they received the death sentence.
This appears unlikely, but maybe Runion, who killed one more person than Benn, might fall into
this category. See id. at 687, 845 P.2d at 321.
Finally, the court needs to discuss why cases were excluded from the pool of similar cases.
It appears that all the other potentially similar cases in which the defendant was sentenced to
death were significantly more brutal than Benn's crime, and therefore, are distinguishable. See
id. at 689-72, 849 P.2d at 322-23. There are several potentially similar cases where the defendant
was not sentenced to death that do need to be further distinguished. Examples of these are
Kenneth Peterson, who murdered a husband and wife, and William Kincaid, who murdered his
wife and sister-in-law after a marital breakup. See id. at 702, 845 P.2d at 328-29 (Utter, J.,
dissenting).
Even assuming that the majority finds the same seven cases similar, under the advocated
"majority" approach, fifty-one percent of similarly situated defendants must be sentenced to death
if the court is to find a sentence proportionate. In this case, three of seven (forty-three percent)
similar cases imposed the death penalty, and since forty-three percent is less than fifty-one
percent, Benn's sentence was disproportionate. Benn should die a natural death in prison.
